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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3180 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE HEALTH (DHSS) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-01028) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2018 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 17, 2018) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se litigant Matthew Jones, a frequent filer in the federal courts,1 appeals from 
the District Court’s September 11, 2017 order dismissing this civil action with prejudice.  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that decision. 
I. 
 In June 2017, Jones commenced this pro se action in the District Court by filing a 
three-page document titled “Motion For A Change of Venue To This Court” (hereinafter 
“Venue Motion”).  That rambling and disjointed filing consisted of various undeveloped 
allegations.  Among the many allegations were claims that Jones is a slave, that he was 
taken illegally from his biological parents as an infant (he avers that he is now 31 years 
old), that he is being “held to [his] fictitious name by deadly force,” that “[t]he State 
raped [him] through [his] youth,” that “[a] plan was devised to label [him] 
schizophrenic,” that the police raped and murdered his girlfriend when he was a teenager, 
and that the police stalk him every day and have searched his car “close to 100 times.”  
Jones further claimed that, during a traffic stop, a police officer “confessed to the rapes 
and murders of over 100 elementary school children.”  Jones’s Venue Motion was 
accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a form “Civil Cover 
Sheet” used for commencing civil actions.  The Civil Cover Sheet listed Delaware Health 
and Social Services (“DHSS”) — an agency of the State of Delaware — as the lone 
                                              
1 In this Court alone, Jones has litigated more than a dozen cases since 2016. 
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defendant,2 identified the causes of action as “Poisoned[]- Held Illegally[]- Attempted 
Murder[]- Identity Theft,” and sought $2 billion in damages. 
 The United States Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case liberally 
construed Jones’s Venue Motion as a civil complaint and screened that pleading pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Upon completing that screening, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a report recommending that the District Court dismiss Jones’s case with prejudice.  
The Magistrate Judge explained that DHSS was entitled to sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment, and that Jones had failed to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted against DHSS.  The Magistrate Judge further explained that granting Jones leave 
to amend his pleading would be futile.  On September 11, 2017, the District Court 
granted Jones’s IFP motion, overruled his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, 
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and closed the case.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Jones’s case.  See Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996) (reciting standard of review 
for dismissal of an action on sovereign immunity grounds); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 
                                              
2 The Venue Motion did not list any defendant in its case caption. 
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229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (reciting standard of review for dismissal of an action 
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted). 
 For the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s report, which the District Court 
adopted, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Jones’s action against DHSS 
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.3  We further agree that, in light of that 
jurisdictional bar, see Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 693 n.2 (noting that “the Eleventh Amendment 
is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction”), any 
attempt to amend Jones’s claims against DHSS would be futile.4  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s September 11, 2017 order dismissing Jones’s action against 
DHSS with prejudice. 
                                              
3 In light of this holding, we need not reach the question whether Jones’s allegations 
against DHSS failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted.  
4 To the extent that Jones might have intended to seek relief against other, unspecified 
defendants, his 24-page appellate brief does not even attempt to show that an amended 
complaint including such defendants would have raised one or more viable claims.  See 
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (“An amendment is futile if the 
amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.”).  Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude 
that the District Court abused its discretion in declining to grant Jones leave to amend.  
See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (reciting 
standard of review for a district court’s denial of leave to amend).       
